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Gulf Arab Financial Flows and Investment,
2000-2010: Promises, Process and Prospects
in the MENA Region
Karen Pfeifer

Abstract
The Gulf Arab countries were promoted as dynamic, rapidly growing and self-transforming
economies in the boom years of the 2000s, and were praised for their purported leadership of the
MENA regional economy. As of 2010, despite the severity of the financial crisis and recession
of 2008-2009 in the Gulf and consequent impact on the rest of the region, the GCC countries
were still promoted as potential leaders of both the recovery and future regional development. An
examination of the evidence regarding the direction, magnitude and uses of GCC financial flows
both domestically and internationally from 2000 to 2010 finds that the investment programs in place
in the boom years provided outcomes that only weakly fulfilled these promises and that they barely
fulfilled them at all during the economic crisis and recovery. The author’s assessment is that GCCsourced investment since 2008 mainly addressed the Gulf region’s internal development project,
although even that seemed dependent on continued high levels of hydrocarbon revenues, and did
little to demonstrate the promised leadership of the regional economy by the GCC.
KEYWORDS: foreign direct investment, regional integration, political economy
Author Notes: A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the Eleventh Mediterranean
Research Meeting, Florence and Montecatini Terme, 6-9 April 2011, organized by the Robert
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute.
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During the boom years of the 2000s, the six Arab countries of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) gained a reputation as dynamic, rapidly growing and
self-transforming economies. In contrast to the resource-curse cycle of the 1970s
and 1980s, they invested relatively more, and consumed less, of their windfall
hydrocarbon revenues. Investment entailed more internal diversification, with
large infrastructure projects, downstream hydrocarbon spin offs, new nonhydrocarbon-dependent industries, and the nurturing of private sectors (Khamis
and Senhadji 2010b: 50). By 2010, these private sectors appeared collectively to
be dominated by an elite pan-GCC private capitalist class, a set of conglomerates
that superseded traditional state-dependent commercial families, forming private
equity funds and spreading investment over many sectors (Hanieh 2011: 2, 140145).1
Gulf-based public and private funds were also credited with successfully
diversifying their overseas portfolios to spread risk geographically in both
Western and emerging markets, including the MENA region (Mohieldin 2008;
Samba 2008; IIF 2007). Investment in the MENA region was elevated by some
analysts, including those writing for the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank (IFIs), to the GCC’s assumption of a “pace-setting” leadership role in
the regional economy (e.g., Khoury and Wagner 2010: 23). Under the influence of
what he dubbed “Khaleeji capital,” even a more critical analyst concluded that,
“The entire Middle East is increasingly moving to a single beat – inextricably
linked to the rhythms of accumulation and class formation in the Gulf” (Hanieh
2011: 148). During the crisis and recovery of 2008-2010, authorities continued to
praise GCC-based capital’s purported leadership and beneficial impact and its
potential for leading the regional recovery and future economic growth (e.g.,
World Bank 2010a: 1).2
This paper reviews the regional growth record for the 2000s, the sources
of that growth, and the various streams of finance flowing into and out of the
GCC through the boom, crisis and recovery, including both liquid capital and,
most focally, foreign direct investment (FDI). The analysis finds that much more
international capital, including FDI, flowed into the GCC than flowed out from
the GCC to the region in the 2000s. The last two sections, on the financial crisis,
recession and recovery, assess the impact of GCC-sourced public and private
investment on the region’s economies through 2010 and its potential to lead future
regional growth. Were the emperor’s new clothes just a passing fad or did they
initiate an enduring trend in a newly-refashioned regional economy?

1

See Tabet and de Saint-Laurent 2011 for a comprehensive review of Gulf-based and other
private equity funds operating in the Mediterranean through 2010.
2
See World Bank 2010b: 11-12, 144-145; IMF 2010a and 2010b; Khamis and Senhadji 2010a and
2010b; Burke and Bazoobandi 2010; Iradian 2009; Farrell and Lund 2008, Eid 2008 75, 77.
1
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The Growth Era, 2000-2008
Between the 2001 recession and the 2008 financial crisis in the West, the global
economy expanded rapidly, and, for the most part, MENA economies grew in
tandem. Figure 1a portrays the real GDP growth rates of the GCC-6 economies in
those years with projections to 2012. Qatar is an outlier from 2005 on due to rapid
growth of its natural gas industry, but part of Qatar’s growth, like that of the rest
of the GCC, came from the use of surging hydrocarbon revenues to create large
public domestic investment programs and to stimulate private sector development.
Figure 1b compares the averages of GCC growth rates with the averages of two
groups of “developing” (also called “diversified”) Arab Mediterranean countries,
those of the eastern and North African groups, and to Turkey and Israel, generally
considered to be the two most “developed” of the regional economies. Especially
after 2003, the growth rates appear to fluctuate in tandem.3
Strong regional growth in the 2003-2008 period was fed by export
revenues, remittances, revenues from tourism and other services, and a surge of
investment. Figure 2 indicates that the annual additions of international reserves
to the developing countries of the region, such as Egypt and Jordan and not
including the GCC, increased by a factor of about 3.8, while workers’ remittances
increased by a factor of 2.2. The build up in reserves came from the boom in
hydrocarbon and other exports, including manufactured exports, and the rise in
remittances was due to increased demand for emigré labor in the growing
economies of host countries in the region and in the West. Furthermore, net equity
inflow, mostly accounted for by foreign direct investment (FDI), rose by a factor
of 6.2, from $4.2 billion in 2002 to $26 billion in 2006 (World Bank 2009a: 128,
Table A10). From 2000 to 2007, according to World Bank calculations, MENA’s
investment to GDP ratio increased by five percentage points and capital
deepening accounted for two-thirds of the growth in potential output in the region,
placing MENA in the middle, as opposed to the bottom, of the developing country
range for the first time (World Bank 2010b: 6-7).
In interpreting the data depicted in Figure 2, which includes net financial
inflows from all sources, a World Bank document waxed enthusiastic about the
origins and purposes of GCC investment, giving the impression that the GCC was
primarily responsible for the inflow of FDI to these countries (World Bank 2009a:
128). However, this impression overstates the commitment of GCC capital to the
region and the quality and sustainability of the GCC-sourced FDI that did
materialize.

3

Israel and Turkey were more integrated than other Mediterranean economies with both the
financial and commodity sectors of the West, and so suffered more from the 2001 recession than
did their neighbors.
2
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Fig 1a. Real GDP Growth, GCC Countries, 2000-2012p
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Liquid Capital Flows
Changes in Current Account Balances (CAB) and Uses of Surpluses
All significant hydrocarbon exporters in the MENA region experienced rising
current account surpluses in the 2000-2008 years, followed by a sharp drop in
2009 and a partial recovery in 2010. Figure 3 displays the CABs of 16 Arab
countries, eight hydrocarbon exporters and eight “developing” or “diversified”
economies, showing the great advantage of the former over the latter when
hydrocarbon prices were high. The Top Four, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
Qatar and the UAE, together had a cumulative surplus of over US$ one trillion
from 2000 to 2008. One portion of these funds was used to service debt and
augment domestic investment, much of which relied on imported inputs. A
second portion was exported for overseas investment by both publicly owned
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and private investment companies or individuals,
including foreign direct investment outside and inside the region. A third portion
was siphoned off into illicit financial outflows.
Fig 3. Curr Acct Balances, Arab Oil Exporters and Developing, 2000-10
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Net Changes in International Debt
Despite this unprecedented surge of surplus capital, the GCC countries borrowed
on world capital markets. Figure 4a indicates that none of the GCC countries paid
down debt, and, indeed, several added to it in those years in order to finance
infrastructure and other projects that were among the largest in the world (IIF
2007: 6). In contrast, Figures 4b and 4c show Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and to a lesser
degree Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, reducing their debt relative to GDP in those

4
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Fig 4a. External Debt Relative to GDP, GCC-6, 2005-2009

Debt as Percent GDP

18 0
16 0
14 0
12 0
10 0
80
60
40
20
0
BAH

KU W

OM A

2005

QA T

2006

2007

2008

KSA

UAE

2009

Source: Dhaman 2010: Country Fact Sheets
Fig 4b. External Debt Relative to GDP, Dev MENA, 2005-2009
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Fig 4c. Net Capital Flow s: Net Debt Flow s, Developing MENA, 2002-2008
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years. Lebanon’s external debt is overstated here because a large part of the debt
was held locally in foreign currencies.4
Outflows of GCC Capital to the Rest of the World
A report by the Samba Financial Group5 estimated the cumulative value of the
GCC’s current account surplus from 2003 to 2008 to be $US 911.6 billion, of
which the traceable net asset holdings rose from $170 billion to $544 billion,
leaving $368 billion unaccounted for (Samba 2008). The traceable funds were
tracked into three types of foreign asset holdings each year: deposits with the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) used, for example, to pay for imports,
U.S. financial claims such as Treasury bonds, and FDI. Over these years, the
share to BIS deposits declined from 38 to 14 percent, while holdings of U.S.
securities rose from half to two thirds, and FDI outflows rose from 7 percent to 20
percent. About $120 billion of the FDI went to other parts of the MENA region
(Samba 2008: 11-12).
While $120 billion of GCC investment in the region was unprecedented
and suitably heralded, it was small relative to the amount of petrodollars sent to
the West, indeed two-thirds to the United States alone. The $450 million the GCC
invested in U.S. securities from 2003 to 2008 was almost 60 percent greater than
the $285 billion total FDI, from all sources put together, that was invested in the
MED-13 economies in those years.6 In one dramatic example, investors from Abu
Dhabi and Qatar spent US$12 billion in a single transaction in October 2008 to
purchase 16 percent ownership in Barclay’s Bank, one of the U.K.’s crisisstricken financial institutions (Samba 2008: 14), 20 percent more than the $9.5
billion in FDI that flowed into Egypt in the whole year 2008. This performance
compares poorly to the standards for intraregional investment elsewhere. In 2003,
for example, members of the EU invested 75 percent of total FDI in their own
region and countries in the Integrating Asia Sixteen group (IA-16) invested 64
percent of their total FDI in their own region (Capannelli et al. 2009: 7-8).7
4

By 2007 the MENA region showed the second best performance of all developing regions (after
East Asia and Pacific region) in terms of debt relative to GDP and current account balance relative
to GDP and the lowest inflation rate of all developing regions (World Bank 2010b: 5). On
Lebanon, thanks to Ghassan Dibeh for the clarification, and see IIF 2011: 27 for more detail
5
The Samba Financial Group is located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Besides its financial business
operations, it gathers data and composes reports for the Institute of International Finance.
6
The “MED 13” rubric includes the economies of the southern and eastern rim of the
Mediterranean Sea: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian
Territories, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. When Cyrpus and Malta are excluded,
because they joined the EU in 2004, the group is the “MED 11.” When Turkey, which became a
candidate to join the EU in 2004 is excluded, the group is the “MED 10.” The “Med 10” is also
sometimes used when Turkey is included but the Palestinian Authority or Libya is excluded.
7
The “EU-15” were the members of the European Union at the end of 2003, namely Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
6
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Capital Flight
The untraceable portion of the GCC’s current account surpluses from 2003 to
2008, $368 billion, is surmised to have fled the region in favor of private bank
accounts abroad, what the project for Global Financial Integrity (GFI)8 labels
“illicit financial flows” (IFF).9 The total amount of IFF for a given year is
estimated from discrepancies in balance of payments accounts and is suspected to
be due to siphoning off of hydrocarbon export revenues and trade mis-pricing,
meaning over-invoicing of imports and under-invoicing of exports (Kar and
Curcio 2011: 3-7). Popularly known as “capital flight,” illicit financial outflows
represent a drain on the capital available for investment within a country and thus
retard economic growth. A path breaking study on the MENA region found that
capital flight was a significant problem for the resource-rich economies, where it
was shown to “negatively and significantly affect economic growth” (Almonsour
2008: 33-35).
The amounts of IFF estimated for the world’s developing regions add up
to a staggering global total of US$6.5 trillion from 2000 to 2008. Of that amount,
the MENA region accounted for almost 18 percent, about $1.2 trillion. MENA’s
illicit outflows grew at over 24 percent per year, the highest rate of growth of IFF
among developing regions (Kar and Curcio 2011:14-15). While the rest of MENA
countries were not innocent, the four outstanding generators of IFF were Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar, MENA’s “Top Four.”
These countries placed as numbers 4, 6, 7 and 9, respectively, among all
developing countries ranked by the amount of IFF in the 2000-2008 period.
Together they accounted for $957 billion of the developing countries’ cumulative
IFF for 2000-2008, that is, 14.7 percentage points of the 17.9 percent from
MENA as a whole. These funds were thus lost to local or intraregional
investment.
Figures 5a and 5b show the cumulative totals and average per year,
respectively, of current account surpluses and IFF for the Top Four in comparison

Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, prior to the accession of Malta,
Cyprus and eight central and eastern European countries in 2004. The “Integrating Asia 16” (IA16), was composed of ASEAN nations (Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore Thailand and Vietnam), plus China, Japan, South
Korea, Hong Kong, India and Taipei (Capannelli et al. 2009: 1-2).
8
The project for Global Financial Integrity is sponsored by the Center for International Policy in
Washington DC, and the research was funded by the Ford Foundation.
9
“Illicit flows involve capital that is illegally earned, transferred or utilized and covers all
unrecorded private financial outflows that drive the accumulation of foreign assets by residents in
contravention of applicable capital controls and regulatory frameworks” (Kar and Curcio 2011: 3).
The flows are not necessarily earned illegally; they are “illicit” if they are not recorded and thus
enable the sender to avoid taxation or capital controls.
7
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Fig 5a. Cum Total CAB & IFF, Top 4 & All Other MENA, 2000-2008, $US Bn
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to the rest of MENA combined, illuminating the concentration in their hands of
liquid capital flowing through the region. Figure 5c compares the amounts of
8
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CAB, IFF, and Inter-Arab FDI outflow of the Top Four in 2008, illustrating how
small their actual FDI was in proportion to the financial resources that could have
been available for intraregional investment in that year.

Foreign Direct Investment
Why Focus on FDI
There was much excitement among both investors and international financial
institutions in the 2000s boom about FDI to “emerging markets,” mostly countries
that had been defined previously as the underdeveloped or developing regions of
the world. This excitement arose out of the conviction that FDI is more beneficial,
and entails a deeper and longer-lasting commitment, to the development of these
economies than other forms of capital transfer such as lending.
Policy makers in international organizations and many economists who
study the MENA region (e.g. Dhaman 2010: 5; Eid 2008: 69; Iqbal and Nabli
2004) consider FDI to be especially desirable because it may introduce more
sophisticated and efficient technology, bring higher productivity along with more
jobs, increase the competitiveness of the host country’s exports on world markets
and boost absorptive capacity. While some econometric studies of regional
economies support the theory that FDI leads growth (e.g., ESCWA 2011: 23-34;
Bakardzhieva et al. 2010), other research has found that it is faster growth that
attracts FDI (Institute of International Finance 2011: 8) or that there is an
interactive or feedback effect between growth and FDI (Al-Iriani and Al-Shamsi
2007: 2; Metwally 2004: 381).
Some scholars suggested that FDI inflow to the MENA region, as
compared to other developing regions, was discouraged by a set of country-level
impediments, such as non-transparency, corruption, high risk due to political
conflict, price inflation and remaining barriers to trade (e.g., Elafif 2009). Until
these impediments could be overcome and multinational corporations began to
invest in the region rather that just exporting to it, economists have suggested that
the best medium-term development strategy for the region was to use its surplus
capital to invest in itself, develop human resources to promote growth, and
become more internally coherent and thus more attractive to foreign investors in
the longer term (e.g., Khoury and Wagner 2010). Intraregional FDI would be the
logical core of such a program.
The rub is that foreign investment in the MENA region is embedded in
and constrained by political as well as economic relationships. Among others, the
European Union (EU) and GCC both supplied FDI to the Mediterranean countries
in the mid 2000s. However, European private investment was linked to the EU’s
several successive Euro-Mediterranean partnership projects, with complex
agendas entailing security, migration-control, and cultural and political
9
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components in addition to aid and economic development (Schumacher 2010; Del
Sarto and Schumacher 2005). In 2011, the Arab Spring inspired renewed efforts
by the GCC to cooperate with the EU on the economic as well as the political
front to “ensure that these countries [with new regimes] return to a forward path
of economic and social progress” (i.e., neoliberal economic reform) and to
underline that the GCC is “promoting security and stability both in its immediate
neighborhood and the wider Middle East” with its political and strategic
commitments (Sager 2012).
How exactly, then, did FDI into and within the region contribute to, or
interact with, economic growth in the 2000s?
Global FDI Inflow to the Larger MENA Region and its Sub-regions
Foreign direct investment to MENA from the world as a whole rose in tandem
with the global boom in FDI to emerging economies in the mid 2000s. ESCWA
data indicate that these flows to the West Asia region10 rose from US$ 40 billion
in 2005 to over $84 billion in 2008. Through the crisis years, West Asia received
a rising share of FDI to the world, from 3.3% in 2007 to 4.8% in 2008 to 6.5% in
2009. Its share of inflows to all developing regions also rose, from 12.4% in 2007
to 13.4% in 2008 and 15.2% in 2009 (ESCWA 2010: 2; 2009:2). Defining the
“region” somewhat differently, as Dhaman does, yields a similar picture, with the
Arab countries as a group11 commanding a rising share of global FDI over the
2000s. FDI to the Arab region in 2007 was 4.1 percent of FDI to the world and
15.3 percent of FDI to developing regions, and in 2008 5.7 and 15.5 percent,
respectively. Furthermore, when FDI to the world decreased by 38.7 percent from
2008 to 2009, FDI to the Arab region decreased by just 17.7 percent (Dhaman
2010: 12, 14).
The major beneficiaries of this inflow were not the developing countries
of the region, but rather the wealthiest hydrocarbon exporters. Figure 6a shows
the growth of global FDI from 2005 to 2009, the share of global FDI that went to
the Arab countries and the share that went to the GCC countries in particular. The
GCC countries, with 10 percent of the Arab countries’ population, about 40
million people including resident non-citizens, received around 60 percent of the
global FDI that flowed into the Arab region from 2005 to 2009. As seen in Figure
6b, Saudi Arabia was by far the biggest single recipient, averaging about one-third
of global FDI inflow per year (Dhaman 2010: Table 6).

10

“West Asia” includes the GCC countries plus Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian Territories, Egypt,
Sudan, Jordan, Iraq and Yemen.
11
For Dhaman’s purposes, the Arab region includes all of the Arab countries of West Asia plus
those of North Africa and other predominantly Arabic-speaking African nations, namely Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania, Djibouti and Somalia.
10

Pfeifer: GCC Financial Flow and Regional Economy

Fig 6a. FDI Inflow s to World, to Arab, to GCC, 2005-2009, $Bns
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Inter-Arab FDI
Saudi Arabia was also the leading recipient of one definition of intraregional
investment, namely investment among the Arab countries. As shown in Figure 7a
in dollar amounts, and Figure 7b in percentage shares, Saudi Arabia received the
single largest share of inter-Arab flows of FDI from 2005 to 2009, even during
the crisis. In 2009, total inter-Arab FDI dropped by 36 percent from its peak in
2008, but, of that smaller amount, more than half went to Saudi Arabia, allowing
its dollar inflow to drop by just 9 percent (Dhaman 2011: Tables 3 and 4). It was
also the single largest recipient of GCC flows. In 2008, 55 percent of UAE, 56
percent of Bahraini and 68 percent of Kuwaiti inter-Arab FDI went to Saudi
Arabia. In 2009, these shares tended to be even larger, with 75 percent of UAE,
65 percent of Bahraini and 70 percent of Kuwaiti inter-Arab FDI going to Saudi
Arabia (Dhaman 2010: Tables 3 and 4; 2009: Table 4).
11
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Even among inter-Arab investors from the eastern Mediterranean, FDI
flow favored Saudi Arabia, which won 44 percent of Syrian, 64 percent of
Palestinian, and 68 percent of Jordanian inter-Arab investment in 2008.12 Only
Lebanese and Egyptian capital favored other developing countries in 2008, with
82 percent of Lebanese inter-Arab FDI going to Sudan (mostly banking) and 85
percent of Egyptian inter Arab FDI going to Algeria (a cement plant). In 2009,
Saudi Arabia was even more favored, winning 98 percent of Syrian, 89 percent of
Palestinian, 88 percent of Egyptian, 73 percent of Jordanian and 57 percent of
Lebanese inter-Arab FDI (Dhaman 2010 and 2009: Table 4).
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia took in much more inter-Arab FDI than it put
out. In 2008, it took in $13.0 billion but sent out just $2.1 billion. In 2009, it took
in $11.6 billion, but sent out just $1 billion. Figure 8 shows the origins of interArab FDI, in dollars, by source. In 2008 and 2009, the most important sources
were Kuwait and the UAE, with Saudi Arabia ranked sixth. In 2008, it was
surpassed by, surprisingly, Egypt, Oman and Lebanon, and, in 2009, by Bahrain,
Qatar and, again surprisingly, Jordan (Dhaman 2010 and 2009, Table 4). Saudi
Arabia in particular, as well as the GCC in general, had come to be a magnet for
FDI from all sources.
The GCC and Saudi Arabia as Magnets for Extra- and Intra-Regional FDI
Given the shift of strategy toward productive investment of part of capital
surpluses in the 2000s, the GCC had come to be treated by some enthusiastic
analysts as a vibrant, rapidly developing and increasingly integrated single
economy, expected to become an “economic powerhouse” by 2050 (Akarli 2008:
47-51, 57-58, 64). With a joint population of about 40 million and a collective
GDP of more than a trillion dollars in 2010, as well as net assets of at least one
trillion dollars, the GCC was portrayed as a “natural hub” for finance, commerce
and transportation linking three continents, a beacon of progressive economic
policies and political stability surrounded by a “natural economic hinterland” of
300 million people in a region “beset by political instability and low growth”
(Toksov 2008: 81-87, 93-94).13 In the late 2000s, both internal and pan-GCC
investment plans entailed ambitious projects for heavy industry, physical
infrastructure such as ports, highways, railroads, and whole new industrial and
residential cities. By 2010-2011, proposals included alternative energy, such as
wind and solar, a region-wide electricity grid that could be extended to other parts
of MENA and beyond to Europe and Asia, telecommunications networks,
12

Indeed, Jordan put out more inter-Arab FDI in 2008, $0.9 billion, than it took in, $0.4 billion,
while Lebanon issued almost as much as it took in, $2.3 billion versus $2.6 billion.
13
The IFIs also treated the GCC as a freestanding unit separate from the rest of the region. In their
68-page study, Khamis and Senhadji (2010a) did not once mention intraregional investment as
part of the GCC’s past activity, current program or future planning.
12
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Fig 7a. InterArab FDI, by Host, 2005-2009, US$ Bns
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Fig 8. InterArab FDI by Source, 2008-2009, $US Bns
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residential construction, including affordable as well as luxury housing, social
infrastructure and the subsidization of private enterprise initiatives in
manufacturing, real estate and services (Toksov 2008: 84-87).14
As the biggest and leading economy in the GCC, Saudi Arabia became
attractive for FDI from many sources in the 2000s. Whereas its outflows and
inflows were more balanced in the 1990s, Saudi cumulative inflows in the 20052008 boom years totaled $US 93.2 billion, while outflows were just $US 15.5
billion (UNCTAD 2009: Country Fact Sheet, Saudi Arabia). In 2008 the sources
of 44 percent of existing FDI stock were firms from the United States, Europe and
Japan, while 13 percent had come from the UAE and 9 percent from Kuwait.
These sources remained important for FDI inflow in 2009, but China, Russia and
Malaysia all moved up in source ranking (SAGIA 2010b: 7-8), an indication of
the expanding role of non-Western, non-Arab capital in the region. While real
estate took 21 percent of FDI, reflecting internal diversification, energy-intense
sectors remained a big draw, as hydrocarbon and related industries -- mining, oil,
gas, refining, chemicals and petrochemicals -- accounted for 41 percent of FDI in
2008 (ESCWA 2009: 5). As one admirer claimed, “Saudi Arabia is set to become
a heavy industry base for the region… Current plans… envisage that by 2020 the
country will supply 15 percent of the world market for aluminum and plastics”
(Toksov 2008: 81, 84- 87).
The Saudi Arabian Government Investment Authority (SAGIA) addressed
its appeal to potential foreign investors in terms of such diversified opportunities
and its accommodating environment. With rising scores on the World Bank’s
“competitiveness” and “doing business” indices (Dhaman 2010: 19-20), Saudi
Arabia ranked eighth in the world for FDI inflow in 2009.15 As SAGIA’s website
put it, “Saudi Arabia is undertaking aggressive reforms and investments to
become one of the world’s Top 10 most competitive economies by 2010… It’s
[also] about unfettered access to regional markets and financial services.” This
promotion offered investors easy credit, high consumer confidence and growing
domestic demand, comprehensive public infrastructure investment, and low-cost
access to fuel and feedstock for energy-intensive industries in four new planned
cities. It also promised a high quality of life for expatriate families living in the
country’s “famous compounds,” with “first-rate international schools” and “state
of the art health facilities.” Under “Key Benefits,” SAGIA also compares Saudi
Arabia favorably to other GCC countries and to Egypt, showing that, in 2008,
14

See http://corp.gulfinthemedia.com/gulf_media for many examples from Gulf news outlets.
See, for example, Khalil Hanware, “Saudi Arabia’s Ability to Attract FDI Becomes a Big
Success Story,” Arab News, Jan 25, 2011; and S.H. Moulana, “Saudi Arabia Breaks into Top 10
for FDI,” Asian Tribune, July 24, 2010
(http://arabnews.com/economy/top_100_fdi/article242771.ece;
http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2010/07/24/saudi-arabia-breaks-top-10-fdi)
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Saudi expenditure on education was 50 percent greater as a percent of GDP and
its real aggregate GDP 2.4 times larger than were Egypt’s (SAGIA 2010a).
There were two constraints that the SAGIA promotion did not mention.
First, the core industries in Saudi Arabia were kept in the hands of state
enterprises, usually in the form of joint ventures with transnational corporations or
Khaleeji conglomerates, and were not open to independent foreign investment
(Hertog 2010: 177-178). Second, the 2008-2009 crisis depressed both domestic
and foreign investment, as about 23 percent of $2 trillion worth of domestic
projects were suspended or cancelled (IIF 2009: 3; ESCWA 2009: 5). In the face
of overcapacity in productive sectors and oversupply of real estate in Qatar and
the UAE, as well as debt-servicing problems and some major defaults (see
“Financial Crisis” below), Saudi and other GCC private sector investment
remained subdued in 2010. FDI into Saudi Arabia decreased in 2009 and 2010, by
a cumulative 26 percent from its peak in 2008 (Dhaman 2011: Country Fact Sheet
Saudi Arabia). What FDI was flowing into Saudi Arabia in 2010 was not due to a
booming private sector but rather a response to old familiar stimuli, namely, high
prices and growing profits from the hydrocarbon and related sectors, and
guarantees of sovereign backing and public partnerships for the reduced number
of projects in which foreign firms were still likely to be interested.
Magnitude of GCC FDI to the Mediterranean in Comparative Perspective
While FDI to the developing countries of the region in the 2000s, and especially
GCC FDI, was widely celebrated, the magnitude, timing and distribution of these
flows raised serious questions about their sustainability and their contribution to
broad-based economic welfare. Figure 9a indicates that FDI to the 13 southern
and eastern Mediterranean countries from all sources rose from Euros 10 billion
in 2003 to an apogee of Euros 66.7 billion in 2006, about 4.5% of total world FDI
that year (Henry et al. 2008: 10-11). Second only to China, the MED region took
in more FDI in 2006 than other competing regions, including ASEAN,
MERCOSUR, India and Russia (Economist 2008). However, FDI to the MED
stopped rising two years before the onset of the 2008 financial crisis, and, by
2009, had crashed to less than half of its 2006 level.
GCC-sourced investment in the Mediterranean through 2007 was less than
Europe’s but more than North America’s. For the expansion period from 2003 to
2007, the Gulf countries provided 27.3 percent, favoring the Mashreq. The EU
and other European countries provided 37.2 percent, favoring Turkey, the
Maghreb, and Egypt, and North America provided 23.7 percent, strongly favoring
Israel and, to a lesser extent, Turkey, Egypt and Algeria. About eight percent
came from other regions of the world, with the MED countries suppling about
four percent to one another (Henry et al. 2008: 153, Annex 2). The one year in
which Gulf investment surpassed Europe’s in both absolute and relative terms
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was 2006, the peak year for FDI to the MED from all sources, at 31 and 30
percent, respectively (de Saint Laurent et al. 2011: 10, 12).16
The destinations of this FDI and its magnitude relative to the host
economies give some indication of its promise and limitations until the 2008
crisis. The three top recipients were Turkey 29 percent, Israel 20 percent, and
Egypt 15 percent (Mishrif 2010: 135, Table 6.3). Figures 9b and 9c indicate the
percentage of GDP and the per capita amounts, in Euros,17 that FDI represented
for the MED countries from 2005 to 2007. Most promising was that FDI averaged
5 percent of GDP or more for all countries in the group, with Jordan at the top,
averaging 25 percent, followed by Syria at 19, and Egypt at 15. Israel received far
and away the highest FDI per capita, at 1250 Euros. In this case, FDI flowed not
to a needy developing country but to what was considered the most advanced
economy in the region with the highest GDP per capita of the MED group,18
illustrating that FDI was following, or at least interacting with, growth rather than
leading it. GCC FDI could have helped the Arab Mediterranean economies to
bring them into competitive range with Israel and to compensate for the United
States’ favoring of Israel. However, GCC investment was sometimes not
developmentally sound and, in any case, declined in magnitude after 2008.
GCC FDI Projects in the Arab Mediterranean in Comparative Perspective
The impact of foreign direct investment can be evaluated by its contributions to
development in the host country. Such contributions are the production of
significant value and growth in the domestic market as well as for export, the
creation of employment and linkages to related economic sectors, the spread of
benefits in the population, the appropriateness of the scale of the project to the site
and to the social community in which it is located, and the extent to which the
announced investment is actually implemented (Luçon and Lapujade 2011: 2028).
Led by the UAE with 52 percent, Gulf-sourced investment in the
Mediterranean countries from 2003 to 2009 favored larger scale projects than did
European investors and generally avoided higher-risk small and medium-size
enterprises (SMEs). Gulf funds allocated 27 percent of total incoming FDI to just
16 percent of announced projects in those years, with the average amount invested
per project about twice that of the European investors. Gulf investors were more
likely than Europeans to undertake greenfield mega-projects in real estate (hotels,
16

Tabet and de Saint-Laurent 2011 Annex 1, provides a list that includes such firms, as does
Hanieh 2011: 142-143, Table 5.8, and 187-202, Appendix A.
17
When the Euro was formally inaugurated in 2000 as the common currency of most of the
members of the European Union, it was set equal to the value of the US dollar. By 2008, however,
its relative value had risen to a monthly average of about $1.45 per Euro.
18
Israel’s real GDP per capita in 2006 was US$ 20,792, with Cyprus a distant second at $ 14,718
and Malta third at $10,487 (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD).
17

Submission to Review of Middle East Economics and Finance

tourist resorts, high-end shopping malls), public works, transportation (ports and
airports) and utilities (electricity, water supply). These projects created temporary
jobs in construction, but, except for tourism, fewer permanent jobs and less
technology transfer than the European-sponsored projects in manufacturing or in
partnership with existing SMEs in, for example, the ITC sector. Furthermore,
Gulf projects had an implementation rate of 43 percent, as compared to 71 percent
for European investments (de Saint Laurent et al. 2009: 5-8, 10-11; Burke and
Bazooandi 2010: 5-7).
Tunisia provided a case study of a proposed but never implemented megaproject, the “Mediterranean Gate” on the Lake of Tunis. This joint venture
between the Tunisian government and the investment firm Sama Dubai, owned by
Dubai Group Holding company, aimed to develop the southern shore of the lake
into a vast commercial, residential and tourist center, taking 10 to 15 years to
complete at a total cost of about $18 billion (Kerr and Wigglesworth 2011;
Wikipedia 2011). Criticized for its grandiosity, elitism and social and ecological
insensitivity, this proposal would have superimposed the Dubai urban
development model on an ancient Mediterranean city with limited natural
resources and absorptive capacity. Both the contract and its cancellation due to
the financial crisis seem to “underline the fragility of a state such as Ben Ali’s
Tunisia [which was] unable to set a real strategy for its capital, but [was] eager for
bribes and other forms of corruption” (Barthel 2011: 2, 10-14).19
GCC FDI in the region often took the form of mergers and acquisitions, as
the GCC became a more important global purchaser of firms in other countries
(Dhaman 2011 and 2010: Table 8). For example, two Dubai firms, including the
deeply indebted Dubai Group Holding company, which had borrowed to finance
its share, committed over $3 billion to purchase a 35 percent interest in Tunisie
Telecom in 2006, accounting for 68 percent of total FDI from all sources to
Tunisia in that year (UNCTAD 2012: 6-7). However, this entailed no investment
in new productive capacity, and by early 2011 the Dubai Group was trying to
liquidate its share in order to repay its creditors. Similarly, over the course of the
2000 to 2007 period, half of the incoming FDI to Egypt from the GCC went to
acquisitions of existing firms rather than new projects. Some of these acquisitions
were purely financial, such as that by the privately-owned National Bank of
Kuwait of Al Watany Bank, one of Egypt’s most successful private banks. Other
acquisitions entailed purchases of privatized public sector enterprises, such as the
2007 takeover of the Egyptian Fertilizers Company by a firm from the UAE, and
did not create new facilities or additional value (Henry et al. 2008).
19

A few more positive examples had emerged by 2008, for example the Bab al-Bahr project near
Rabat, also under the auspices of Sama Dubai. Although the investor had to withdraw in 2009, the
Moroccan government had employed European technical advisors to negotiate a greater sensitivity
to both the ecology and the social life of the community in which the project was to be sited
(Barthel 2011: 14-15).
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Both European and Gulf investors put a significant part of their funds into
financial services like banking and insurance, 19 percent and 12 percent,
respectively, and into telecommunications and the internet, each 15% (Saint
Laurent et al. 2009: 5-8; Economist 2008; IIF 2007: 5-6) but Gulf investors also
favored real estate and tourism. Lebanon, the premier example of these kinds of
investment during the financial crisis, saw a rise in its intake of FDI in 2008, to
$3.6 billion, almost one-third greater than in 2007. Real estate and construction
together claimed over 56 percent of the total, with banking taking 20 percent and
tourism 13 percent. ICT and industry came in significantly lower, at 7 percent and
3 percent, respectively. Virtually all of the FDI came to Lebanon from Gulf
countries: Saudi Arabia 70 percent, Kuwait 22 percent, UAE four percent, and
Qatar two percent (ESCWA 2009: 12-13), an example of exported capital
alighting in what was considered to be a safe haven for bank deposits and real
estate that would hold its value through a crisis.
Of total GCC-sourced inter-Arab FDI in 2008, 61 percent went to
services, 28.5 percent to industry and 2.9 percent to agriculture (Dhaman 2009:
Table 5). Much of the industry entailed investment that added value to the host
economy, such as new infrastructure, cement and metallurgy factories, and
specialized high-technology sectors like organic farming and logistics (Mohieldin
2008: 40-41). Much smaller proportions of GCC FDI were allocated to the
manufacture of light industrial products and consumer goods for mass domestic
consumption and to agriculture and ICT, contributing less to sustainable broadbased development than did European investors (Luçon and Lapujade 2011: 2028; de Saint Laurent et al. 2011: 8-17; Henry et al. 2008).
Syria, Jordan and Egypt provided examples of investment in industry.
Like Lebanon, Syria and Jordan experienced an increase in inflows of FDI from
all sources in 2008, despite the financial crisis, and Syria saw an increase again in
2009. Industrial projects in Syria included refineries run as joint ventures with
national petroleum companies from other countries, automobile assembly, and
cement and paint factories, as well as services like banking, insurance, and
communications. Besides Arab neighbors, including Saudi Arabia, Iraq and
Jordan, and some European countries, investment came from Iran, Turkey,
Malaysia, Venezuela, and, especially for petroleum refining, China (ESCWA
2011: 19-20; 2009: 17). This turned out to be part of the new growth trend in nonWestern, non-Arab FDI to the region.
In 2008, 56 percent of FDI to Jordan went to manufacturing and 36
percent to tourism and hotels. Like Syria and Lebanon, but unlike Egypt, a major
share of FDI in 2008, 53 percent, came from other Arab countries, in particular
from the UAE at 26 percent, Kuwait 16 percent, and Saudi Arabia 11 percent,
while a minor share came from the West, e.g. the United Kingdom with 29
percent (ESCWA 2009: 10-11). Unlike Syria, the manufacturing sector in Jordan
that attracted the most FDI was in the enclave-style Qualified Industrial Zones
19
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(QIZs), where most enterprises were owned by non-Jordanian firms employing
non-Jordanian workers.20 The firms produced goods like textiles and electronic
components for duty-free export to the EU and the United States. In 2009, FDI
from the UAE plunged, causing the share from Arab countries to fall to less than
one-third, while the share from non-Western, non-Arab investors rose to 60
percent (ESCWA 2011: 16-18).21 As in Syria and the MED countries in general,
non-Western, non-Arab capital was growing as Gulf capital faded.
Named as one of the top ten global “reformers” in 2008, according to the
World Bank’s Doing Business 2009, Egypt was proclaimed the most successful of
Arab Mediterranean countries in attracting FDI in general and Gulf investment in
particular. FDI from all sources had risen by a dizzying factor of 26 in just a few
years, from $450 million in 2003 to a peak of $11.6 billion in 2007. While more
than half of Egypt’s inflows of non-hydrocarbon FDI in 2007-2008 went into
financial and other services, a third went to manufacturing, nine percent to real
estate and construction, and the last four percent to tourism, agriculture and ICT
(Mohieldin 2008: 40-41). According to one enthusiastic observer writing before
the financial crisis of 2008, Egypt was “the most integrated with the GCC
investment program,” receiving about 40 percent of the GCC’s FDI in the
Mediterranean from 2003 to 2007, about $US 3.3 billion at its peak in 20062007.22 During that year, Egypt also received $US 1 billion in remittances from
the GCC, and Egypt’s exports to the GCC rose to almost $550 million, including
iron and steel, which made up 30% of Egypt’s non-hydrocarbon exports (Eid
2008: 75-77).
Contrary to the impression given by these observers (Eid 2008; Mohieldin
2008), the bulk of total FDI to Egypt actually came from the West (see “Energy”
below) and GCC FDI was not sustained. In 2008, for example, 33 percent came
from the United States and 36 percent from the European Union. Only 18 percent
came from other Arab Countries, mostly in finance, real estate and construction
(ESCWA 2009: 9). In the later part of the calendar year 2008, the wave of FDI to
Egypt began to ebb, in total decreasing by 18 percent from 2007 to 2008 and then
by another 30 percent in 2009. Liberal reforms notwithstanding, the Arab share of
FDI to Egypt fell to 15 percent of the total in 2009, then to 13 percent in 2010,
20

Most of the workers were from South Asia. The treatment of these workers and their
unregulated working and living conditions were repeatedly and publicly criticized by a number of
sources, including the United States State Department, from 2006 to 2011 (Institute for Global
Labor and Human Rights. 2011. “Campaign: Jordan,” 2006 to 2011
(http://www.globallabourrights.org/campaigns?id=0017).
21
Main sources of non-Arab, non-Western investment were Israel, India, Sri Lanka and South
Korea.
22
Egypt’s fiscal year brackets two calendar years, so statistics are often cited in this form. The
IFIs adjust the incoming data to spread it over adjacent calendar years so that Egypt can be
compared to other countries.
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with the UAE’s contribution declining most steeply (Dhaman 2011: Table 7 and
Country Fact Sheet, Egypt).
Mixed Legacy of GCC FDI in Mediterranean
On one hand, real estate projects such as luxury apartment blocks, gated
communities, shopping malls and tourist resorts were mostly targeted to wealthier
social strata and contributed little to sustainable development. The focus on
mergers and acquisitions, in which GCC purchasers became increasingly
important on a world scale in the 2000s, and on financial and other services
provided few developmental benefits unless the acquired enterprises were actually
improved. Investment in manufacturing for export often took place in free-zone
enclaves, creating too little of the forward and backward linkages and new jobs in
the host economies that FDI theoretically generates. The evaporation of 50
percent of Egyptian firms from the stock market from 2007 to 2010 (see
“Financial Crisis” below) may mean that privatization and mergers and
acquisitions dampened competition and productive activity, contrary to
predictions by proponents of liberalization.
On the other hand, many projects contributed to gross fixed capital
formation (GFCF) in infrastructure, utilities, transportation and logistics, and Gulf
investors were less interested in energy extraction than in practical downstream
uses of hydrocarbon inputs for production of plastics, chemicals and fertilizers.
The growth of manufactured exports in Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco in
the 2000s lends credence to the argument that FDI is endogenously and causally
related to growth. Furthermore, FDI to the Med in the 2000s, from all sources,
may have helped to raise productivity growth, from an annual rate of 0.6 percent
in 1986-1990 to more than two percent per year from 2001 to 2008. This, in turn,
may have stimulated more investment among MED countries themselves, as
Turkish and Egyptian Trans-National Corporations (TNCs) in particular were
praised for their contributions to intra-Mediterranean FDI from 2003 to 2010 (de
Saint Laurent et al. 2011: 11-14, 18-28, 38-39).
Despite the steep decline in quantity after 2007, some qualitative changes
in FDI from all sources to the MED gave promising signs for future development.
First, after the cancellations or suspensions of many projects in 2009, the number
of announced projects for 2010 rose by more than 50 percent, from 542 to 826.
These were smaller, less costly, and more focused projects, including among
Gulf-based investors, such as partnerships with local firms, franchise
arrangements, joint ventures with SMEs, and the joining, and expanding or
improving, of ongoing “brownfield” operations (de Saint Laurent et al. 2011: 911).23 Second, post-crisis investors, from the Gulf as well as from Europe,
23

Energy was again at the top with 19 percent of total FDI in 2010, followed by financial services
with 15 percent, public works and real estate with 13 percent, and telecom/internet with 12
21

Submission to Review of Middle East Economics and Finance

doubled the number of direct jobs created by their FDI between 2008 and 2010 as
compared to previous years (de Saint Laurent et al. 2011: 40-41). Third, some
GCC private equity firms maintained or restored their investments in the MED, or
started new projects, on a more modest scale, open to innovation and making
longer-run commitments that did not provide quick profits (Tabet and de SaintLaurent 2011: 3-6). The UAE-based Abraaj Capital even formally committed
itself to “socially responsible investment” (Luçon and Lapujade 2011: 74).
Continued Primacy of Energy Investment in MED and GCC Subregions
Investment in the energy sector in the region was important to both GCC and
Western firms, as well as to rising non-Western, non-regional investors
throughout the 2000s. Of their total FDI to the Mediterranean in the boom years,
European investors allocated 23 percent to energy projects and investors from
North America allocated 19 percent, while Gulf investors allocated six percent.
As compared to Gulf investors, who focused on downstream industries like
plastics and fertilizer,24 Western firms put more resources into extracting,
processing and exporting energy from the Mediterranean than in using it for
manufacturing in the host economies (de Saint Laurent et al. 2011: 15-16).
Western energy projects in the Mediterranean, unlike most other Europeansponsored FDI, tended to be large-scale, expensive and capital-intensive rather
than employment-generating.
Energy continued to be the single largest sector for FDI inflow to the
Mediterranean through the crisis and recovery years as well, accounting for 24
percent in 2008, 39 percent in 2009, and 30 percent in 2010 (de Saint Laurent et
al. 2011: 15-16). For example, European investors accounted for 89 to 90 percent
of FDI to Tunisia in 2009 and 2010, with energy absorbing 54 percent of total
FDI in 2009 and 62 percent in 2010 (Dhaman 2011: Country Fact Sheet
Tunisia).25 Similarly in Egypt, the hydrocarbon sector absorbed from 27 to 66
percent of FDI over the 2006 to 2010 years.26 Among non-Arab sources of FDI,
59 percent came from Europe, with the UK alone supplying 38 percentage points,

percent. Investment in tourism and chemicals/petrochemicals decreased, while wholesale and
retail distribution, automobile assemblage, aerospace, engineering, public electronics and logistics
shares grew (de Saint-Laurent et al 2011: 15-16).
24
One exception was the privately owned Kuwait Energy plc firm, which worked three concession
blocks in exploration and extraction of oil and gas in Egypt as of 2011
(http://www.arabtimesonline.com/NewsDetails/tabid/96/smid/414/ArticleID/179526/t/KuwaitEnergy-makes-new-oil-find/Default.aspx).
25
As of 2011, the British Gas company controlled 60 percent of Tunisia’s domestic market for
natural gas, which was used to generate electricity among other things, and also exported natural
gas through the pipeline to Sicily (www.investintunisia.tn).
26
www.investment.gov.eg
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and another 23 percent came from the United States, mostly targeted to energy
(Dhaman 2011: Country Fact Sheet Egypt).27
In contrast to their FDI in the Mediterranean in the 2000s, Gulf investors
devoted more resources to developing all stages of energy production, export and
use in their own neighborhood. The growth of natural gas was expected to
outpace that of oil, not only for export, especially by Qatar, but also for domestic
manufacturing, as feedstock for petrochemicals and “clean” fuel for heavy
industry such as aluminum, steel and cement (Samba 2011: 6). In a clear example
of FDI leading growth, Yemen experienced an unprecedented burst of FDI from
2006 to 2008 (see Figure 10a below) from GCC neighbors, led by Saudi Arabia,
to develop natural gas extraction and to complete an LNG production facility.
While FDI in 2009 was less than one-tenth of that in 2008, mainly from Qatar to
operate the new facilities, Yemen’s growth rate had doubled to between seven and
eight percent by 2010 (ESCWA 2011: 21-22).
Sudan experienced surges of both FDI and growth starting in 2003 and
peaking in 2006 with FDI at almost 10 percent of GDP and a GDP growth rate of
11.3 percent. In fact, Sudan ranked among the top five Arab FDI recipients every
year, receiving a cumulative 4.4 percent of total FDI inflow to the Arab region
and 14 percent of inter-Arab FDI in the 2000-2009 period (Dhaman 2011:
Country Fact Sheet Sudan). In 2009, firms from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt
and Lebanon invested in diverse sectors, including energy. However, in another
important illustration of the growing role of non-Arab, non-Western FDI, Asian
sources accounted for 65 percent of total FDI inflow, mostly for energy (ESCWA
2011: 20-21).
Oman and Bahrain were the least wealthy of the six GCC countries, in
terms of both hydrocarbon resources and per capita income, but their economies
were buoyed by energy-related FDI and other transfers. Oil and gas absorbed 65
percent of FDI to Oman in 2008. West Asian neighbors led by the UAE
accounted for 32 percent, the UK 34 percent, and the US 30 percent, all focused
primarily on hydrocarbons. For example, the Abu Dhabi IPIC fund was central to
establishment of new refining and petrochemical plants (ESCWA 2011: 7-8). In
contrast, FDI inflow to Bahrain during the 2000s boom had been concentrated in
financial services, tourism and real estate. FDI peaked at a uniquely high 18.4
percent of GDP in 2006, but collapsed to about one percent in 2009 and 2010,
causing Bahrain to incur the region’s second highest debt to GDP ratio, ranging
from 139 to 155 percent from 2007 to 2010 (ESCWA 2011: 6; Dhaman 2011:
27

Both UK and US investors were enthusiastically focused on energy, from upstream exploration
and production of oil and gas, through transport via the Suez Canal, the SUMED pipeline and the
natural gas grid, to downstream activities like oil refining and gas liquefaction, as well as
distribution to both the domestic and export markets. See US Department of Energy, “Country
Analysis Briefs: Egypt,” Feb 2011 (www.eia.doe.gov) and UK Organization of Trade and
Investment, “Oil and Gas Opportunities in Egypt,” 2010 [both retrieved 8 April 2012].
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Country Fact Sheet Bahrain). However, its growth rate did not fall below three
percent in 2009, as Saudi-based companies continued to invest in Bahrain’s
aluminum and petrochemical industries and to augment the supply of subsidized
crude oil to refine for export.28
Among the Top Four GCC hydrocarbon exporters themselves, Kuwait was
the least attractive to foreign direct investment from any source. As measured by
percent of GDP, its outflows routinely outweighed its inflows by a factor of up to
100 in the 2000s, but the bulk of Kuwait’s inter-Arab investment was within the
GCC, for example 70 percent to Saudi Arabia and 20 percent to the UAE in 2009
(Dhaman 2010: Table 4). In contrast to Kuwait, FDI to Qatar reached a peak of
over 8 percent of GDP in 2009, even as GDP growth rose to almost 12 percent in
that year. The most important source was the United States and the most
important sector was natural gas extraction, liquefaction and associated
downstream industries (ESCWA 2011: 9). The UAE may be unique in that its
inflows and outflows of FDI netted to about zero in the 2000s, with much of the
inflow going to Dubai, almost 90 percent to services, and much of the outflow
coming from Abu Dhabi. These flows were largely intraregional and concentrated
within the GCC. For example, in 2009, Arab sources accounted for over 90
percent of FDI to the UAE, one-third of which came from Kuwait, 17 percent
from Qatar, and 13 percent from Saudi Arabia. In turn, 75 percent of UAE
outward FDI to the Arab world in 2009 went to Saudi Arabia (Dhaman 2011:
Table 4; and Country Fact Sheet UAE).

Financial Crisis, Recession and Recovery
Financial Crisis in the GCC
The global financial crisis and recession of 2008-2009 dealt the GCC economies a
hard blow. It was inevitable that the deflation of the asset price bubble in the West
would cause losses to GCC investment agencies and private funds, given the large
proportion of their portfolios held abroad. The total net foreign assets of the GCC,
including official reserves and holdings by financial institutions and SWFs, had
risen from $500 billion in 2002 to $1.6 trillion by July of 2008, then fell by 19
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An estimated two-thirds of Bahrain’s 2010 budget revenues came from sales of oil from the
Saudi-owned Abu Saafa oil field. Another consistent source of foreign exchange is the US
purchase of fuel for its Western Pacific military operations in informal exchange for Bahrain’s
hosting of the Fifth Fleet naval base (http://www.bahrainedb.com/aluminium-bahrain.aspx;
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/10/06/uk-bahrain-budget-idUKTRE7952UY20111006;
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/06/26/pentagon-billions-are-flowing-to-middleeast-dictators.html).
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percent to $1.3 trillion at the end of 2008. SWFs alone lost 12 percent of their
capital value, from $724 billion in 2007 to $634 billion by end 2008 (IIF 2009: 2).
On the domestic front, imprudent local bank lending had fed a burgeoning
demand in domestic asset markets, including consumer finance, securities, real
estate and construction, where speculation had driven up prices. When these
asset-price bubbles deflated in 2008, there began a “sharp correction” in GCC
financial markets, generating an excessive level of non-performing loans and
threats of default. In 2009, GCC banks faced high ratios for loans-to-assets and
loans-to-deposits, of 60 and 120 percent respectively (NBK 2011: 32-33).
Following a debt default by two private Saudi conglomerates and the UAE-based
Dubai World, net private inflows collapsed (IIF 2010: 19) and local capital fled.29
In addition, GCC borrowers had built up significant debt in international
capital markets during the boom years to finance large-scale investment in
infrastructure and industry, accounting for about 60 percent of total commitments
in 2007 (Hanieh 2011: 133, 138-139). However, the financial crisis of 2008 led to
a “sustained withdrawal of foreign liquidity from GCC financial markets” as
international lenders extracted their outstanding capital to protect themselves from
the fall in value of their assets elsewhere, and portfolio investors flew to safety in
the West, e.g. to US Treasury Bonds. Combined with the fall of export revenues
in 2008 and 2009 due to falling oil prices, this drain on local financial markets left
GCC investors without sufficient funds to service their debt (Carey 2008: 2).
As GDP growth rates plunged (refer to Figure 1a), GCC governments
intervened to support their financial systems and stimulate domestic growth.
Central banks expanded deposit guarantees, bailed out or took charge of
weakened banks and investment companies, and loosened monetary policy, while
large fiscal stimulus programs were put into place (Carey 2008: 2). Given the
“huge infrastructure and energy projects that are already on course,” GCC
governments hastened to provide sovereign backing for distressed financial
institutions in order to restore their appeal to foreign investors (IIF 2010: 20).
Their use of public finance in “cleaning up bank balance sheets” in 2009 and 2010
(NBK 2011: 32-33) enabled larger conglomerates and sovereign investment
agencies to borrow $32 billion in 2009 and $26 billion in 2010 on international
capital markets (Samba 2011: 5, 4, 16).
Crisis Transmission to the Developing MENA Economies
The developing MENA economies were not immediately affected by the financial
crisis of 2008. While they had been criticized repeatedly by the international
financial agencies for insufficient liberalization of their financial sectors, most
29

In just five months, from August 2008 to January 2009, inflows of $2.7 billion were deposited
in Lebanese banks, while official reserves in Lebanon rose from 39 percent of GDP at the end of
2007 to 60 percent at the end of 2008 (Kouame 2009: 6)
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escaped the worst of the crisis for that very reason.30 Except for Turkey, they were
not well integrated into global financial markets and most local banks had not
acquired the kind of “toxic assets” that brought down much bigger banks,
investment companies and insurance companies in the West (Kouame 2009: 6). In
contrast to GCC banks, Levant banks were more vested in government securities
and central bank instruments bearing relatively low risk and had reasonable ratios
of 40 percent for loans to assets and 70 percent for loans to deposits in 2009
(NBK 2011: 32-33).
However, the developing economies were affected indirectly via the GCC
crisis by declines in regional stock markets and shifts in portfolio flows. GCC
stock markets had been informally integrated by the cross-border investments of
Khaleeji private firms (Hanieh 2011: 134-138) and affected performance in other
regional markets. In general, GCC stock market indices peaked in July 2008, fell
by half by March 2009, and were restored to just 75 percent of their peak value by
end 2010 (NBK 2011: 10). Similarly, market capitalization had been at a peak of
$1,300 billion at the end of 2007, fell by 40 percent in 2008, and ended 2010 still
24 percent below the peak. The markets that gained the most in capitalization
were Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait, thanks to public infusions, as markets in
Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon experienced losses.31
Among the shifts in the number and nationality of firms listed on the Arab
stock markets, most countries showed small changes and some added a significant
number of companies, especially Saudi Arabia with a total increase of 43. The
stark exception was Egypt, where listings on the Cairo and Alexandria exchanges
declined by over 50 percent, from 435 firms in 2007 to 212 in 2010 (Dhaman
2011, 2010, 2009: Table 10). In part reflecting the privatization of public sector
enterprises, Egyptian companies’ activities in mergers and acquisitions peaked in
2008, with $16 million worth of sales but just $4.6 million in purchases
(UNCTAD 2011: Country Fact Sheet Egypt). As a group, the Arab countries
reached a peak at 2.7 percent as sellers in global cross-border M&As in 2008, but
accounted for a record 11.1 percent of global purchases in 2009 (Dhaman 2011:
Table 8), led by GCC-based investors’ export of capital.
Real Sector Effects on Developing MENA Economies
The developing economies were affected directly by the recession of 2009, with
declines in hydrocarbon and other export revenues, tourism receipts, labor
remittances, and, most dramatically, equity investment, especially FDI. As oil
prices fell in 2009, oil exporters’ current account surpluses shrank, and remained
30

See, for example, World Bank 2012: 95; World Bank 2010: 8; Sturm and Sauter 2010: 5; IMF
2009: 17.
31
Nadim Kawach 2010. “Arab Bourses Gain $100 billion in 2010, but Trading tumbles by nearly
$224 bn due to Global Crisis,” Emirates 24/7. www.emirates247.com/.../arab-bourses-gain100bn-in-2010-2010-12-28-1.334886
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lower in 2010 than the pre-crisis levels of 2007. The Mediterranean-partner
countries that export oil and gas mainly to Europe, namely Algeria, Libya and
Mauritania, saw their exports to Europe drop by 45 percent, and the more
diversified economies – from Morocco to Lebanon – saw their manufactured
exports to Europe fall by 20 to 30 percent (Sturm and Sauter 2010: 10; World
Bank 2010b: 142-144).
Inter-Arab trade served neither as a cushion in the recession of 2009 nor as
a stimulus during the recovery of 2010. As world trade decreased by 12.2 percent
from 2008 to 2009, total Arab exports to the world decreased by 34 percent, and
total inter-Arab exports decreased by almost as much, 30%. In parallel, as total
Arab imports from the world decreased by 16.5 percent, total inter-Arab imports
decreased by almost as much, 15.8 percent, a surprise given the advantages that
buying necessary imports from the region could have in a recession. In 2010,
while total inter-Arab imports grew at the same 10 percent rate as total Arab
imports from the world, and total Arab exports to the world increased by almost
29 percent, inter-Arab exports increased by only 6.5 percent (Dhaman 2011: 15
and Table 9). The aggregate Arab trade surplus had doubled from 2009 to 2010,
but, as shown in Figure 3 above, most of the benefits went to the major
hydrocarbon exporters, while everyone else’s balance remained negative.
Other secondary effects, such as changes in remittances and tourist
revenues, were varied in their impact on the developing countries in 2009.
Remittances fell for almost all Mediterranean countries in 2009. Morocco and
Egypt incurred the steepest losses, almost 17 percent and 10 percent, respectively.
Some countries that routinely hosted more tourists from the Gulf, like Egypt and
Jordan, lost share, while others, including Lebanon and Syria, gained (Sturm and
Sauter 2010: 11), perhaps accompanying flight capital. In any case, remittances
and tourism revenues would recover faster than FDI in 2009 and 2010.
Impact of Crisis and Recovery on FDI
In 2010, both FDI to the MENA region and inter-Arab FDI continued to favor the
GCC and Saudi Arabia in particular, while FDI to the developing countries,
especially GCC-sourced FDI, remained low. Global FDI recovered slowly in
2009 and 2010, but MENA’s share of world FDI inflow rose to 7.5% and FDI
inflows to the Arab region in particular increased by about ten percent (Dhaman
2011b: 7-10). The leading Arab recipients of global inflow were Saudi Arabia,
Qatar and the UAE, and despite their role in transmitting the financial crisis to the
region, Saudi Arabia and the UAE together took in more than 85 percent of interArab FDI in 2010 (NBK 2011: 15).
The prognosis for FDI to the MENA region after 2011 was most favorable
for those countries that already received large doses of FDI in energy-related
industries or that were considered regional hubs, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the
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Fig 10a. FDI Inflow s. Dev MENA. 2000-2010
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Fig 10b. FDI Outflow s. GCC Mem be rs, 2000-2010
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Fig. 10c. FDI. Inflow to Dev, Outflow from GCC, 2000-2010
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UAE in particular. UNCTAD’s 2010 survey of transnational corporations (TNCs)
predicted that global FDI in 2012 would remain below it peak in 2007, and that,
while FDI would increase to every emerging region, MENA would see the
smallest increase, with the prominent exception of investment in energy
(UNCTAD 2010). Of the projected FDI inflows to Africa and the Middle East
together, $65 billion in 2011 and $67 billion in 2012, 30 percent would go to
Saudi Arabia and the UAE alone, $25 billion and $15 billion, respectively, mainly
to “the energy sector and related industries” (IIF January 2011: 21). Another
survey reported that multinational investors ranked the UAE 11th among desirable
places to invest, and preferred Dubai to Cairo because of the quality of its
infrastructure and logistics, its “ease of doing business,” and its safe political
environment. Comparing it to Hong Kong as the gateway to China, these
investors considered Dubai to be a “hub for the region” connecting more than 500
million consumers from Morocco to Pakistan (Kearney 2010: 11, 20-21), while,
in this view, economies like Egypt were left to languish in the hinterland.
The absolute quantity of FDI to Mediterranean developing countries fell
much more sharply than other inflows, and there was a decided decline in the
GCC’s relative share in 2009 and 2010 as well. As shown in Figure 9a, total FDI
to the MED-13 from all sources fell from its peak in 2006, at Euros 66.7 billion,
to a low of Euros 28.4 billion in 2009. The subsequent increase to Euros 33.2
billion in 2010 was still significantly below the start of the boom in 2005. The
Gulf’s share of the provision had fallen to 16 percent by 2010, while Europe’s
share increased to 51 percent. Furthermore, FDI from “other countries” (that is,
other than Europe, the Gulf, the United States/Canada, and the MED itself), came
in at a record 16 percent, about equal to that from the Gulf. As can be seen in
Figures 10a, 10b and 10c, FDI outflow from the GCC and inflows to the
developing countries of the region were expected to remain subdued after 2010.
The “experts” were quiet on this subject in 2011, as, for example, there is no
mention of Gulf FDI to, or “pace-setting leadership” of, the developing countries
of MENA during the recovery in what would have been the appropriate places in
the IMF’s projections in January 2011 (IMF 2011a: 5, 21, 28, 32, 50-53), while
the World Bank offered a vague hope in January 2012 that GCC intraregional
investment might be restored eventually (World Bank 2012: 125).

Assessment: FDI, Growth and Development in the MENA Region
Lending credence to the argument that growth “causes” FDI rather than the other
way round, GCC-sourced investment in the developing countries of the region,
especially to the Mediterranean Arab countries of Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon,
rose only during the boom years of the mid-2000s, surpassing FDI from other
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regions briefly, when growth was high and liberalization was underway. The one
clear exception was in the case of Yemen’s natural gas industry, where FDI from
the GCC, led by Saudi Arabia, rose from 2006 to 2008 and was then followed by
a burst of growth. At the same time, GCC countries, Saudi Arabia in particular,
absorbed much more financial inflow from the region and from the world than
they provided to the region from 2000 to 2010, a pattern that was expected to
continue in the subsequent decade. GCC countries exported large amounts of
capital to the West, in the legal forms of private equity funds and public portfolios
like sovereign wealth funds, and in the sub-legal form of illicit financial flows, in
proportions that were many times greater than what was offered to the region as
FDI. In the later 2000s, investors from the GCC preferred investment in
themselves to investment in the developing countries of the region, spurred on by
the emergence of pan-GCC private conglomerates with good connections to their
respective home governments (Hanieh 2011: 172-177),
The revival of growth to GCC economies in 2010 was determined by a
combination of rising hydrocarbon export revenues, including increased trade
with the faster-growing Asian economies, public sector investment and
government rescue of a stricken financial sector that had yet to recover as of the
beginning of 2011 (IMF 2011a: 17). Growth in the GCC was expected to increase
in 2011 and 2012 (see Fig 1a), led by rapid increases in natural gas production
and export, but GCC private non-hydrocarbon sectors were expected to remain in
the doldrums, and, contrary to the proud exposition by the Saudi Investment
Authority of all the attractive non-hydrocarbon arenas for foreign investment, the
largest portion of FDI would continue to flow to the hydrocarbon and affiliated
sectors.
Contrary to the prognostications cited earlier by the IFIs and other
economic experts about the GCC’s positive leading role,32 the GCC led the region
into crisis in 2008 with spillovers from its own speculative boom and crash. It did
not cushion the real-sector blows to the developing economies with trade or FDI
during the 2009 recession, and it cannot be credited with leading the recovery in
2010, except for its role in the hydrocarbon industry in its immediate
neighborhood. The GCC’s contributions to the recovery of the developing
economies came passively through traditional channels of tourism and
remittances, both of which flowed as much as from outside the MENA region as
from within it. Figure 11 indicates that FDI lagged behind the restoration of
remittances and tourism revenues.

32

For example, see Khamis and Senhadji 2010b; Sturm and Sauter 2010: 13; World Bank 2010a.;
and Nadim Kawach : “GCC to Lead MENA Growth: World Bank,”
http://www.emirates247.com/eb247/economy/regional-economy/gcc-to-lead-mena-growth-worldbank-2010-05-19-1.245682
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Fig 11. Tourism Receipts, Rem ittances, FDI Inflow s. DEV MENA, 2002-10
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Before the Arab uprisings, growth in the developing economies of MENA
was predicted to return to its long-term trend in 2010 to 2012, as seen in Figure 1b
above, although this was below the high rates attained in the mid-2000s, and
below the average for the developing regions as a group. The restoration of
growth to the developing and diversified countries of the region in 2010 was
determined by their own domestic investment, both public and private, fiscal
stimulus packages, and growing internal demand by all strata of the population
(Khamis and Senhadji 2010a: 145). It was also fed by renewed export revenues
from trade with diverse sources, tourism revenues, remittances from émigré labor,
and growing investment more from Europe and other emerging economies than
from the GCC. As of the beginning of 2011, the emperor’s clothes had become
threadbare, and, instead of a single region running from the MED to the GULF,
these two sub-regions seemed to be going their separate ways in a round of
regional economic disintegration.
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